Conflicts in Development: Tourism and the Cattle Industry in Brazil by Sanchez, Nicholas & O\u27Connell, John F.
College of the Holy Cross
CrossWorks
Economics Department Working Papers Economics Department
8-1-2005
Conflicts in Development: Tourism and the Cattle
Industry in Brazil
Nicholas Sanchez
College of the Holy Cross, nsanchez@holycross.edu
John F. O'Connell
College of the Holy Cross, jfoconn@holycross.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://crossworks.holycross.edu/econ_working_papers
Part of the Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at CrossWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Papers by an authorized administrator of CrossWorks.
Recommended Citation
Sanchez, Nicholas and O'Connell, John F., "Conflicts in Development: Tourism and the Cattle Industry in Brazil" (2005). Economics
Department Working Papers. Paper 81.
http://crossworks.holycross.edu/econ_working_papers/81
Conflicts in Development: Tourism and the Cattle Industry in Brazil
By
Nicholas Sanchez
and
John F. O’Connell
August 2005
 COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
FACULTY RESEARCH SERIES, PAPER NO. 05-12
Department of Economics
College of the Holy Cross
Box 45A
Worcester, Massachusetts 01610
(508) 793-3362 (phone)
(508) 793-3710 (fax)
http://www.holycross.edu/departments/economics/website
†Nicholas Sanchez, Department of Economics, Box 103A, College of the Holy Cross,
Worcester, MA 01610-2395, 508-793-2687 (phone), 508-793-3710 (fax),
nsanchez@holycross.edu
††John F. O’Connell, Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester,
MA 01610-2395, 508-793-2680 (phone), 508-793-3710 (fax), jfoconn@holycross.edu
Conflicts in Development: Tourism and the Cattle Industry in Brazil
By
Nicholas Sanchez†
College of the Holy Cross
and
John F. O’Connell††
College of the Holy Cross
August 2005
Abstract
This paper challenges the conventional view that where there is a political elite,
economic development will proceed along lines that sacrifice future generations for the benefit
of the current ruling class.  We find that shortfalls in the balance of payments will cause those in
authority to promote activities that encourage tourism as a solution to balance of payments
deficit.  The vehicle for generating tourism is the provision of public goods.  More traditional
paths toward development particularly cattle ranching are displaced by tourist attractions.  While
motivated by myopic self-interest, the pursuit of public goods reduces the amount of debt
transferred to future generations and thereby serves to redistribute wealth inter-temporally. 
Brazil over the period 1965 until 1998 is used as a test case.
JEL Classification Codes: O1, O5, P0
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CONFLICTS IN DEVELOPMENT: 
TOURISM AND THE CATTLE INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL 
 
I.  Introduction 
While volumes of research have been devoted to theories of economic growth and 
development, less attention has been given to empirical studies of specific country’s 
efforts toward modernity.1  In the absence of a well developed market mechanism the 
controlling authority must make decisions about which economic sectors to support and 
which to sacrifice.  Early theories that emphasized growth as progressing through stages 
miss the point that in a global economy luxury goods such as tourism may displace 
primary sectors such as livestock at the will of the governing authority.  Unlike the usual 
tragedy of the commons, public goods which attract tourists may be seen as providing a 
higher return to those in power than private goods such as livestock.  Rangel (2005) 
argues that intergenerational public goods reduce the debt that the present generation 
bequeaths to future generations.  As such governments should provide tax mechanisms to 
encourage public goods because in the absence of such measures insufficient attention 
will be given to protecting the interests of future generations.  Our hypothesis is quite the 
contrary: the political elite will use public goods as a short run response to balance of 
payments problems.  The unintended consequence of this myopic decision is that the 
supply of intergenerational public goods increases.  
                                                 
1 Antonio Rangel addresses theoretically how governments decide to invest in intergenerational public 
goods.  Because the decisions involve present and future generations and non-excludability market based 
solutions are not feasible.  See: “How to Protect Future Generations Using Tax-Base Restrictions,” The 
American Economic Review, 95, 1 (March 2005) pp. 314-46. 
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    This paper looks at Brazil where the impact of the global economy as measured by the 
balance of payments has lead to efforts to grow tourism at the expense of cattle 
production.  The next section summarizes the issues involved in development.  Section 
III provides preliminary tests of the model.  Section IV summarizes the findings and 
suggests some implications. 
II. Choices in Development 
The premise of this paper is that authorities make decisions with respect to the sectors of 
the economy they will support.  In the case of Brazil this is a choice between “tourism” 
and cattle.  In many respects this paper may be thought of as Neo-Marxist.  The ruling 
elite makes decisions with respect to which class, tourist or rancher, will best redress 
global imbalances.  Two over-arching questions arise at the beginning of this research: 
(1) Does the authority have sufficient decision-making power to alter the normal course 
of development? (2) Why the tradeoff between tourism and cattle? 
    With respect to the first question the ruling elite have a long history of exercising 
autocratic power in Brazil.2  Abiad and Mody (2005) construct an index of financial 
liberalization for 36 economies from 1973 to 1996.3  On a scale of 0 (full repression) to 
18 (full liberalization) Brazil increases from 1 to 8.  Among Latin American countries 
Chile had the highest level (15) and Brazil and Venezuela were tied for the least liberal.  
Brazil’s index was the same as Zimbabwe and Ghana; the lowest among the African and 
                                                 
2  The role of elites in Brazilian history is well documented in the literature.  An excellent summary can be 
found in Michael L. Conniff and Frank D. McCann, Modern Brazil: Elite and Masses in Historical 
Perspective (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989). 
3 The determinants of financial liberalism and the secular trend are quantitatively measured in Abdul Abiad 
and Ashoka Mody, “Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?” The American Economic Review 
v. 95, 1 (March 2005) pp. 66-88.  
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Middle East countries included.  Given the historical power of the ruling class and the 
state of the financial system the preconditions appear to exist.4 
    The emphasis on tourism and cattle may seem unusual at first glance.  Tourism is used 
as a proxy for the government’s investment in public goods while cattle raising is used to 
measure a private good.  The tourist industry is usually measured by the number of 
tourists, but this is ambiguous.  Writers on tourism are fully aware of the difficulty of 
defining the so-called “tourism industry.”5  While most people are confident that they can 
spot a tourist in a crowd, it turns out that defining the tourist class is extremely difficult 
and frustrating.  Using industry practice it is common to classify an international “tourist” 
as someone from a different country who has traveled to a foreign destination (for 
whatever reason) and stayed there for twenty-four hours.6  From an analytical 
perspective, it must be recognized that people travel for all sorts of reasons: to go to 
funerals, to search for loved ones who have disappeared, to transact or complete a 
business deal, to seek a peaceful environment in which to relax, to purchase goods and 
services that may not be available in some communities, to experience different cultures, 
etc.  Our special interest is with those tourists that travel to enjoy the public goods 
specific to a given region.  It is these people that were the focus of the 1967 law passed in 
Brazil establishing a state tourist agency (EMBRATUR).     
                                                 
4 Edwin McDowell summarizes business in Brazil: “The typical Brazilian large corporation is a “mixed” 
company with private and Government shareholders and independent of the Government bureaucracy, but 
in which the Government is dominant.  …  It has been this way since the Getulio Vargas era, which 
spanned the better part of 24 years, beginning in 1930.”  Edwin McDowell, “Brazil Alters Its Export Mix,” 
New York Times, January 7, 1979, p. F1. 
5 See, for example, Kathleen Carey, “Estimation of Caribbean tourist demand: issues in measurement and 
methodology,” Atlantic Economic Journal, Sept. 1991, v. 19, n.3, pp. 32-41. 
6 Ibid: p.33.   From an operational perspective, there is little alternative to defining a tourist since 
determining motivation would require much more detailed information.   
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    The activity we have defined as tourism arises in two different environments closely 
associated with development and underdevelopment.  In a developed nation, such as the 
United States, public goods tourist attractions have always existed, but they were not 
used on a grand scale until large segments of the population were wealthy enough to 
travel to distant destinations.  
    Domestic tourist attractions were not viewed as engines of growth the way they are in 
less developed countries.  Niagara Falls, the Grand Canyon, Yosemite and Yellowstone 
Parks did not attract the average American—at least until late in the history of this 
country.  Even Niagara Falls, which was much more accessible to the general public, was 
overdeveloped by private enterprise to such an extent that the government had to 
intervene to restore the public goods quality of the asset.  New York City, the prime 
tourist Mecca of this country, came to be such an attraction as a result of private 
commercial and industrial activity.  One exception to the above was Washington, D.C., 
which was planned with a truly public goods goal: the capital would be the pride of the 
American citizens, and would offer monuments, museums, cemeteries, parks and colossal 
public structures that would delight true tourists—those who traveled to experience a 
public good. 
    Natural public goods have always existed in the less developed world.  Victoria Falls 
in Africa or the Iguazu falls in South America have existed prior to civilization.  But 
travel to these distant destinations was always extremely expensive and unaffordable to 
most.  Two factors are necessary for tourism in the modern world: increased wealth and 
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relatively low transportation cost.  It came to pass, then, that wild Africa could be either 
re-discovered or re-invented, and tourism came to be perceived as an engine of growth.7 
    The sub-Saharan African case is important to discuss because it serves as a template 
for a formal model.  Over time, the native population had expanded its control over the 
environment, displacing both wild animals and pests, expanding agriculture and raising 
domesticated animals.  A similar process had occurred in Eurasia and North America, 
with wild animal populations destroyed and replaced with agriculture, hunting and the 
raising of domestic animals.8  In sub-Saharan Africa this process of development has 
been stopped for a variety of reasons. 
    First, black Africa has seen the formation of weak nation states—resulting from 
colonially imposed artificial boundaries and the absence of endogenous economic 
growth.  Second, the leading elite was either trained abroad or interested in imitating the 
institutions of developed nations. And third, many domestic resources were more 
valuable to foreign interests than to the native population. 
    Tourism (as defined in this paper) in black Africa has been based on the development 
of wild-animal parks and other natural public goods that are highly valuable to foreigners 
but of little value to the native population.9 The enjoyment of public goods (Victoria 
Falls, for example) is of little value to a population that is poor even though in close 
proximity.  A conflict arises between the ruling elite who see the benefits of tourism and 
the more traditional growth process involving agriculture and animal raising. 
                                                 
7 One truly extraordinary book covers this topic.  Helge Kjekshus, Ecology Controls and Economic 
Development in East African Society: the case of Tanganyika 1850-1950 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
1966). 
8 Tim Flannery, The Eternal Frontier: an ecological history of North America and its people, (New York: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001). 
9 See: Bill Derman, “Environment NGOs, dispossession, and the state: the ideology and praxis of African 
nature and development,” Human Ecology: An Interdisciplinary Journal, June 1995, v. 23, pp. 199-216. 
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    But why the change from the traditional path?  In a long run growth paradigm the 
process may be economically justified in terms of specialization and measured GDP.  
More immediately and pragmatically tourism is a source of foreign exchange that 
redounds to the governing class.  Countries with the worst balance of payments and the 
need for more centralized governments should be the most inclined to substitute the 
marketing of public goods for the more traditional process.  This change in emphasis 
from agriculture and industry as the bases for development has significant implications 
for the economic and political systems of these societies.  This justifies centralization, 
coordination and extensive marketing networks needed to attract those willing and able to 
travel a significant distances.  Small scale enterprises that could generate a competitive 
environment for both the economy and the political sectors are replaced by the tourist 
enterprises, competing in the world arena.  African nations are trying to use the service 
sector as an engine of growth knowing full well that international tourists will not be 
satisfied with the local accommodations that may satisfy visitors but not pleasure 
seekers.10  Public goods are indispensable but not sufficient to tourism.  A strong 
centralized government is needed to market the public good and provide the 
infrastructure to deliver the foreign tourists who in turn bring in the foreign exchange. 
    Our emphasis is the public goods nature of tourism.11 Public bads may, under special 
circumstances, attract many visitors, but not necessarily tourists.12 The recent tsunami in 
                                                 
10 The growth of the service sector negatively impacts income distribution in underdeveloped countries.   
See: Peter B. Evans and Michael Timberlake, “Dependency, Inequality and the Growth of the Tertiary: A 
Comparative Analysis of Less Developed Countries,” American Sociological Review, 1980, v. 43, pp.531-
552. 
11 The importance of public goods was recognized in 1996 by the President of the Hotel Association of Rio 
de Janeiro, who said: “Rio cannot compete as a resort.  ...  We have to resell the city’s image.  People 
already know about the Corcovado, the beaches and the mulattas.  What they don’t know is that we have 
more than 60 museums.  We think Rio can be a very important center of a new kind of tourism, and a big 
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South East Asia illustrates the point. This horrendous event created a public bad of 
enormous proportions, with death and destruction for thousands of miles.  Visitors both 
from the interior parts of the countries affected and from abroad traveled to the impacted 
coastal areas—in search of survivors, the bodies of loved ones, plus to help in 
reconstructions.  Yet these visitors are officially counted as “tourists” according to the 
industry definition but the intent of their visit is quite different.13  In cities like Recife, 
Brazil young women are recruited into prostitution and the incidence of AIDS is 
increasing as efforts are made to attract tourists.14   Public bads can checkmate public 
goods.  In the 1980s the failure of Rio de Janeiro to curtail crimes against tourists led to a 
significant reduction in American travel.  Even now Americans are a very small part of 
the international tourists with most coming from Italy, Spain, Germany and France.15  
    Our model assumes that economic decisions in many less developed countries 
(including Brazil) are made by a central authority that may be concerned with narrowly 
defined immediate gains which may or may not be compatible with long run growth.  In 
the sub-Saharan case previously discussed, this has meant the development of wild 
animal parks, biased policies against herders and agriculturalists, and a push for 
industries that lack competitive potential in world markets.  Air transportation to remote 
                                                                                                                                                 
center for sports events.”  Larry Luxner, “Rio races to attract Olympic gold,” Hotel & Motel Management, 
February 5, 1966, v. 211, n.2, pp. 4-6. 
12 The fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro became such a serious public bad in the 1990s that the government 
used the military (rather than the police!) to stop the activities of criminals.  Adam Brown,   “Rio’s 
hoteliers applaud Brazil’s use of military force,” Hotel & Management, Jan 9, 1995, v. 210, n.1, pp. 4-6.  
13 This is not to say that people are not attracted to natural disasters and do not get some kind of pleasure 
from such activity.  Crime scenes require crowd control because so many people are curious to see the site.   
14 Marlise Simons points out that women’s groups in Recife are concerned that the city and Brazil as a 
whole “is being promoted as a center for sex tourism” with the support of the government.  Marlise 
Simons, “Brazil’s Fleshpots Bring Tourists and a Backlash,” New York Times, February 24, 1987, p. A4.  
15 James Brooke points out that there are direct flights from most European capitals to Brazil, but not 
between major American cities and Brazil.  While Spain and Italy have made significant investments in 
Brazil, Americans have lagged behind.  James Brooke, “Europeans Chase the Sun to Brazil’s Northeast,” 
New York Times, March 15, 1994, p. D2. 
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locations is subsidized, and local infrastructure is provided to ensure access to wild 
animal parks and the beach areas that cater to foreign tourists.  Foreign hotel chains reach 
special deals with the ruling class which may be impossible to scrutinize in the protected 
environment of Swiss bank accounts, black-box governmental decision-making and a 
culture of political corruption.16, 17 Pursuit of international tourism will shift government 
resources from the promotion of private activities to the creation, or at least the 
protection, of public goods which are attractive to the foreign tourists.  Some private 
enterprises (such as hotels, usually of foreign origin and capable of serving foreign 
tourists) will gain a foothold in the economy with promises of extensive employment 
opportunities for the local population and/or with self-serving ecological arguments about 
promoting or protecting public goods assets.  The connection between which enterprises 
win and which lose in this political economy game is not always obvious, except that in 
the sub-Saharan case it is quite obvious that animal raisers lose to the tourist sector.  That 
is precisely the hypothesis that this paper wants to test in the case of Brazil. 
    It is not obvious that the Brazilian case fits the mold, for the country is not as 
underdeveloped as most African countries.  Per capita GDP in 2000 in dollars was 7,745 
similar to that in Botswana, Russia, South Africa and Venezuela.  The growth rate of per 
                                                 
16 The labyrinth of policies that affect agriculturalists’ income and prices has been brilliantly exposed by 
Steven M. Helfand and Gervasio Castro DeRezende in “The impact of sector-specific and economy-wide 
policy reforms on the agricultural sector in Brazil: 1980-98,” Contemporary Economic Policy, April 2004, 
v. 22, pp.194-213. For an earlier period, see also Steven M. Helfand “The political economy of agricultural 
policy in Brazil: decision making and influence from 1964 to 1992,” Latin American Research Review, 
Spring 1999, V. 34, pp. 3-33.  This article, quite correctly, places heavy emphasis on the state-regulated 
hierarchical system of corporatist social relations.  
17  It should also be noted that the switch from military dictatorship to democracy in Brazil did not change 
corrupt practices: “Several authors maintain that, contrary to expectations, transition to democracy did not 
reduce presidential reliance on traditional patronage politics, but actually increased it.” This evaluation 
comes from a review by Eliza Willis of a book by Keith S. Rosenn and Richard Downes, eds. Corruption 
and Political reform in Brazil: the Impact of Collor’s Impeachment, in the Journal of Latin American 
Studies, August 2001, v. 33, p. 643.  Things have not much changed in recent times: “On a scale of one to 
10—10 being a nation without any political corruption—Brazil garnered a 3.9 rating [in 2003 and 2004].” 
“Corruption remains the same in Brazil,” UPI NewsTrack, Oct 20, 2004. 
 11
capita GDP from 1960 to 2000 was similar to that of Canada, Chile and the United 
States.18   Brazil, however, had a government sector that sought centralization of power in 
economic decisions and a tourist dependent on long-distance travel; conditions ideally 
suited for manipulation by a central authority capable of generating new public goods.19  
The market mechanism is encumbered by a labyrinth of regulations, subsidies, taxes, 
alternative exchange rates regimes, and industrial payoffs to government officials.  
Brazil, however, has a long history of external political independence, and its elite is fully 
aware that wealth creation requires the production of commodities if the country is going 
to experience long-term growth.  This has been demonstrated in the past, where the ruling 
elite have promoted both agricultural and industrial development.  At one time the ruling 
oligarchy had close ties to ranching while in more modern regimes the cattle industry is 
poorly represented.20      
    The tourist sector in Brazil (which is a small part of the whole economy) presents the 
government with the opportunity to use tourism as a short run tool rather than a long run 
engine of growth.  Imbalances in goods and services (well observed in the foreign 
exchange accounts) can be covered with tourist income and, if absolutely necessary, with 
borrowing in the foreign exchange markets.  Tourism becomes the first line of defense 
against planning and performance errors.  Tourism which can be obtained through the 
manipulation of taxes, subsidies and the exchange rate becomes a policy variable driven 
                                                 
18 See: Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Betina Aten (2002) Penn World Table Version 6.1. Center for 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP). October and Robert J. Barro and 
Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth, 2nd ed. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004. . 
19 See Paulo Prada, “Stranded: miles of beaches but no easy way to get there. Brazil’s tourism needs a 
break,” Latin Trade, Oct 2004, v. 12, pp. 54-55.  
20 The “coffee and cream [ranching]” interests controlled Brazil from the last decade of the 19th century to 
the second decade of the 20th century.  However, only ranching interests extended their influence to a later 
period because of  Getulio Vargas, who was dictator from 1930 to 1945, and served as a democratically 
elected president from 1950 until 1954.  He came from an elite ranching family.  See: Marshall C. Eakin, 
Brazil, the Once and Future Country.  New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1998, pp. 37-46.    
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by the previous currency imbalances.  EMBRATUR has the authority to certify projects 
defined by the national tourist council as eligible for tax incentives which once when to 
cattle.21 
    The difference between tourism and cattle is both one of public and private good as 
well as one of social class.  Foreign tourists to Brazil concentrate in the large urban areas, 
and the public goods aspects of these areas must be preserved or even improved in order 
to maintain their tourism quality.22  This translates into a shift of the population away 
from the traditional central cities and to the ever expanding suburbs, urban centers in the 
interior and into the countryside, where economic intensive activities (such as 
agriculture) replace the more traditional, extensive cattle industry.  The population move 
towards the interior of the country was a formal government policy designed and 
implemented by President Kubitschek in the second half of the 1950s. This was promoted 
with the founding of a new capital in 1960, the construction of extensive road networks 
and the granting of subsidies to settlers.  Since our study covers the years 1965 to 1998, 
we hope that it captures and helps explain policy decisions that willfully created large 
population movements within Brazil. 
    The one population movement that has been extensively studied in the literature is the 
colonization of the Amazon—where cattle production expanded.23  However, Amazon 
colonization and that of the surrounding cerrado frontier, misses the point that the rural 
population in many other states decreased in absolute numbers.  For example, the state of 
                                                 
21 Thomas Lovejoy, an American ecologist points out “In Amazonas state, hotels are now getting the tax 
incentives that 10 years ago went to cattle ranchers.”   James Brooke, “Growth in Tourism is Benefiting 
Fragile Environment,” New York Times, August 8, 1989, p. C4.   
22  See: “Brazilian cities: a future for the past,” The Economist, Nov 14, 1998, p. 96. 
23 The reason for that appears to be that livestock has been used to claim land in the new frontier; see 
Susanna B. Hecht, “The logic of deforestation in Amazonian,” Bioscience, Nov 1993, v. 43, n10, pp. 687-
96. 
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São Paulo lost 1,298,271 people in the rural areas during the 1960s and 1,267,786 in the 
1970s. In fact, excluding the Amazon and cerrado frontiers, there was a loss of rural 
population in Brazil of 3,564,756 people during the 1970s.24 Also, the rural areas of 
Brazil lost 15.8 million people during the 1980s due to net migration, with the Northeast, 
the Southeast and the South experiencing the largest rates of rural population losses.25 
    The process of economic growth is complex and multidimensional.  While tourism and 
cattle may be substitutes at the margin other factors will promote the growth of both. The 
cattle industry has experienced a growing trend over time, resulting from technological 
improvements and increased demand due to population growth. On the other hand, the 
income growth of the existing population will itself create a demand for a better-quality 
urban environment, inducing the dirigisme class (which also happens to live in that urban 
environment) to preserve and improve the living space of cities.  Income growth, will 
further contribute to the displacement of people from the traditional urban centers that 
cater to the tourist class. 
    An alternative hypothesis might be that cattle is a function of the price and particularly 
the external price of beef. High international prices for beef may lead to restrictions on 
domestic consumption of beef, but increased production for international sale. Cattle 
production could rise because of increased sales abroad or fall because of decreased 
consumption at home. 
Testing the Model 
                                                 
 
24 Anna Luiza Ozorio de Almeida, The Colonization of the Amazon (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 
1992), p. 19. 
25 Stephen G. Perz, “The Rural Exodus in the Context of Economic Crisis, Globalization and Reform in 
Brazil [1],” International Migration Review, Fall 2000, v. 34. 
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The theory developed in the previous section is not easily unraveled and tested.  Data are 
difficult to obtain and verify.  Further the decision making process is driven by variables 
not common to market models.  Finally, the process is sequential rather than 
simultaneous.  We assume the following sequence of events.  In stage 1 deficits in the 
real balance of payments (BOP) act as an incentive for policy-makers to undertake 
actions to stimulate tourism (TOUR).  In stage 2 the inflow of tourism is at the expense of 
cattle (CATTLE) raising and thereby a reduction in the number of cattle.  This may arise 
because tax incentives are switched from cattle to tourism and/or tourism may reduce the 
amount of land suitable for cattle.  The following equations summarize the process: 
                                TOURt = b0 + b1BOPt-1 + b2 Xt + et                 (1) 
                                CATTLEt = c0 + c1TOURt + c2X’t + et’          (2)  
    In equation (1) tourism is assumed a function of the balance of payments last year.  A 
number of other lag structures were tried but a one year lag proved most significant.   Xt 
refers to a vector of exogenous variables including growth in GDP and time.  A number 
of other variables were tried including electricity consumption, net exports and 
population, but proved insignificant.  In equation (2) the number of cattle is assumed a 
function of the amount of tourism and a vector of exogenous variables including beef 
prices in Argentina, growth in GDP and time.  Real Beef prices in Argentina measures 
the demand for beef in the export market and are assumed exogenous to the Brazilian 
beef price.  The growth in GDP measures cyclical changes over time while the time 
variable captures the overall trend in the economy.26   Other variables were tried 
including other prices, electricity consumption and acres devoted to rice production.  
                                                 
26 Electricity consumption was used along with and in place of time.  Together they were highly 
multicollinear.  Since the objective was to capture the trend, time was chosen. 
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Other prices and rice production were insignificant while electricity consumption was 
highly multicollinear with the growth in GDP.  Table 1 defines the variables and gives 
the data sources for the period 1965 to 1998. 
    Figure 1 displays tourism and cattle over time.  Both are clearly affected by a trend 
component indicating a positive linear relation.  Figure 2 shows the same variables 
measured in first differences; detrending leads to what appears to be an inverse but not 
very strong relation. 
    A number of approaches were taken in an effort to quantify the process.  In the first 
column of Table 2 the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of tourism and cattle are 
reported.  Both time and the real balance of payments significantly affect the amount of 
tourism.  The rate of growth in GDP is not significant but it is positive.  In the cattle 
equation tourism has the expected negative effect and it is significant.  This occurs 
despite the strong positive trend component.  The growth in GDP is not significant and it 
is negative.  Beef prices have a negative effect but are not significant. 
    While the premise of this paper is that tourism drives out cattle, and alternative might 
be that they are simultaneously determined.  What we observe is the outcome of a 
conflict between those supporting cattle and those supporting tourism.  The coefficient 
for tourism would then be biased and inconsistent.  To determine whether the causality is 
in fact from tourism to cattle a number of alternative estimation techniques were tried.  In 
a two-stage instrumental variable approach (2SLS), TOUR in equation 2 is replaced with 
an instrument assumed a function of the lagged real balance of payments, real beef prices, 
time and GDP growth.  Two-stage least squares accounts for possible simultaneity 
between TOUR and CATTLE.  The results for the cattle equation are quite similar to 
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those in the OLS estimates.  The growth in GDP is now significant and negative.  The 
reduction in standard errors indicates a gain in efficiency.  In columns three and four the 
model is estimated using two systems methods: three stage least squares (3SLS) and 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).  The estimates are very similar.  Despite a very 
strong trend component the lagged real balance of payments has a significant negative 
impact on tourism.  Both tourism and GDP growth have significant negative effects on 
cattle after controlling for secular change. 
     The data on tourism include people who visit a country for business or personal 
reasons unrelated to public good consumption.  How large a fraction these people are is 
difficult to determine precisely.  The coefficient of determination between TOUR and 
GDP was .2346 indicating that some “tourism” is related to production.  The estimates in 
Table 2 indicate, however, that even after controlling for GDP tourism continues to have 
a significant negative impact on cattle.  These results are consistent with data provided by 
the Instituto Brasileiro de Turismo indicating that in 1994, 76% of the visitors to Brazil 
were tourists, 19.4% were engaged in business transactions, 2.9% attended conventions 
and 1.4% visited for other reasons.  In 1998, 71.8% were tourists, 22.7% were engaged in 
business transactions, 4.0% attended conventions and 1.6% visited for other reasons.  
Tourism appears to account for roughly 75% of all visitors.   
    The elasticity of cattle with respect to tourism (measured at the means) ranges from      
-.039 to -.048 with an average over the estimates of -.043.  While the effect is statistically 
significant, the size of the coefficient is quite small. 
Summary and Conclusions 
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Where free markets are not allowed to make choices, governments may choose to support 
some sectors at the expense of others.  Such decisions may not be important enough to 
reverse economic trends, but they may have marginal impacts on the allocation of 
societal resources.  Evidence of this is seen in various African countries, but its presence 
in other countries has not been studied.  This paper looks at a more developed country, 
Brazil, where it is theorized that a public good generating tourism is supported at the 
expense of a private good cattle.   
     The results of the empirical tests are tentative because of limitations in the availability 
of data and the complexity of the decision making process.  Despite these problems the 
evidence is supportive of the view that governments can make substitutions among 
sectors of the economy.  Public goods rather than private goods may be preferred in the 
short run by the ruling party.  While the general view is that the provision of 
intergenerational public goods may not be politically feasible because of the costs to the 
present generation, we show that central authorities may use such goods to address 
immediate financial needs.  
      This paper is a first step in examining how political power can be used to change the 
traditional process of development.  The narrow interests of the ruling party may lead to 
more resources being devoted to intergenerational public goods.  The conundrum is that 
political power and short run gain leads to unanticipated benefits to future generations. 
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                                                                            Table 1 
Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
TOUR : Individuals measured in thousands entering Brazil who stay at least 24 hours; 
United Nations: Statistical Yearbook (annually). 
BOP:  Nominal balance of payments deflated by the price of U.S. exports (base is 1990); 
Statistical Abstract of Latin America (annually). 
CATTLE:  Number of cattle livestock; International Historical Statistics: The Americas 
(periodically). 
GDP:  Annual rate of growth in real GDP;  Statistical Abstract of Latin America 
(annually). 
BEEFP: Real beef price in Argentina (base 1990); Statistical Abstract of Latin America 
(annually).  
TIME : Beginning with one in 1965. 
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Figure 1 Cattle and Tourism
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Figure 2 First Differences
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    Table 2: Regression Estimates
OLS 2SLS 3SLS SUR
Dep Variable
TOUR
BOP -3.6273 * -3.6273 * -3.6328 *
0.9572 0.8973 0.8971
TIME 80.6148 * 80.6148 * 80.6078 *
9.1257 8.5548 8.5547
GDP 4.6906 4.6906 4.7113
20.6111 19.3216 19.3214
Constant -505.513 * -505.513 * -505.89 *
250.475 234.805 234.8
R^2 0.8283 0.8283 0.8283
CATTLE
TOUR -3.7217 * -4.1031 * -4.6104 * -4.2525 *
1.1628 1.0494 1.6682 0.9663
TIME 3524.14 * 3533.31 * 3582.71 * 3547.95 *
140.995 126.259 168.674 116.259
BEEFP -12.488 -9.6416 -11.0196 -10.0674
14.0972 12.6587 11.7284 11.6549
GDP -158.959 -387.128 * -386.335 * -386.816 *
139.688 148.308 137.197 136.605
Constant 61548.4 * 62374.7 * 62303.4 * 62354 *
1936.76 1757.66 1649.24 1618.97
R^2 0.9909 0.9924 0.9923 0.9923
Notes: * Significant at 5 percent.
           R^2 in the systems estimations are only approximations.
           Two stage least squares for the tourism equation are the same as the ordinary
           least squares estimates.
           N=33.
24
